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EDUARDO L. FERMÉ, Departamento de Computación, Universidad
de Buenos Aires, Pabellón I Ciudad Universitaria (1428), Buenos
Aires, Argentina. E-mail: ferme@dc.uba.ar
Abstract
In recent papers [10, 11] Krister Segerberg introduced Irrevocable Belief Revision, as closely related
to AGM revision [2]. In this paper we present irrevocable belief revision in terms of an epistemic
entrenchment relation.1
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1 Background
The AGM model [2] characterizes changes in the belief of a rational agent. AGM
recognizes three different kind of change: expansion (that consists in adding a new
belief), contraction (eliminating a belief from the belief corpus of the agent) and re-
vision (adding new beliefs preserving consistency). Krister Segerberg [10, 11] argues
that there is a distinction between actual belief revision and merely hypothetical be-
lief revision, and to capture it, proposes a new model, closely related with AGM:
Irrevocable belief revision. 2
In irrevocable belief revision, just as in the AGM model the beliefs of a rational
agent are represented by a belief set K, a set of sentences in a language L. K is
closed under logical consequence Cn, where Cn satisfies: A ⊆ Cn(A), Cn(Cn(A)) ⊆
Cn(A), and Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) if A ⊆ B . We assume that Cn includes classical
logical consequence, satisfies the rule of introduction of disjunction into premises and
is compact. ` α is an alternative notation for α ∈ Cn(∅) and K+α for Cn(K∪ {α}).
> is an arbitrary tautology, ⊥ the falsity constant, K⊥ the inconsistent belief set3
and K the set of all belief sets.
Irrevocable belief revision also includes a second belief set V, that represents a set of
1Full version of a contributed paper presented at the 6th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation
(WoLLIC’99), http://www.di.ufpe.br/~wollic/wollic99, held at the Hotel Simon, National Park of Itatiaia, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, May 25–28 1999, with scientific sponsorship by IGPL, FoLLI, ASL, SBC, and SBL, and organised
by Univ. Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) and Univ. Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Financial support was
given by CNPq (Brazil), CAPES (Brazil), and Facoltà di Scienze della Univ. di Verona (Italy).
2“Ordinary theories of belief change do not seem suited to handle the sort of hypothetical belief change that goes on,
for example, in debates where the participants agree, for the sake of argument, on a certain common ground on
which possibilities can be explored and disagreements can be aired. One need not actually believe what one accepts
in this way. Nevertheless such acceptance amounts to what may be called a doxastic commitment, one that cannot
be given up within the perimeter of the debate. Someone who no longer wishes to honour such a commitment may
be described as in effect abandoning the debate, perhaps in order to initiate another debate with a different set of
doxastic commitments.” [10]
3Note that K⊥ = L.
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doxastic commitments, which are treated as irrevocable.
Definition 1.1 [11] Let V, K be belief sets in L. A pair (V,K) is called a complex
if and only if V ⊆ K.
Let C be the set of all complexes. Segerberg proposed the following axiomatic for
irrevocable belief revision:
Definition 1.2 [11] Let (V,K) be a complex in a language L. ∗: C × L → (K,K)4
is an irrevocable revision, where for all α, (V, K) ∗ α = (Vα,Kα) if and only if it
satisfies: 5
(∗1) (V, K) ∗ α is always a complex.
(∗2) Kα ` α.
(∗b) Vα = Cn(V ∪ {α}).
(∗3) If K 6` ¬α, then Kα = Cn(K ∪ {α}).
(∗4) If V 6` ¬α then Kα 6= K⊥.
(∗5) If ` α ↔ β, then Kα = Kβ.
(∗df) K(α∨β) = Kα or K(α∨β) = Kβ or K(α∨β) = Kα ∩Kβ.
(∗c) For all α, ∗′ : C×L → (K,K) satisfies that 6 ((V, K)∗α)∗′β = (V, K)∗(α ∧ β).
(*2) is redundant, since it follows from (*b) and (*1)7. We reproduce the original
axiomatic. The following lemma follows trivially from the definition:
Lemma 1.3 ∗′ satisfies (∗1),(∗2), (∗b), (∗3), (∗4), (∗5), and (∗df).
2 Entrenchment-Based Irrevocable Revision
The notion of epistemic entrenchment was introduced in [3] by Gärdenfors to represent
formally a preference ordering among formulae in a theory. The standard postulates
of epistemic entrenchment are:
(EE1) If α ≤ β and β ≤ δ, then α ≤ δ. (transitivity)
(EE2) If α ` β, then α ≤ β. (dominance)
(EE3) α ≤ (α ∧ β) or β ≤ (α ∧ β). (conjunctiveness)
(EE4) If K 6= K⊥, then α 6∈ K if and only if α ≤ β for all β. (minimality)
4“Note that the irrevocable belief revision functions are regarded as binary functions, but they are just partially
defined on the set C × L. Once the first argument has been fixed to be a given complex (V, K), the function is
well defined for every language formula. Consequently, we can take irrevocable belief revision functions as a unary
function ∗: L → (K,K)” [V. Becher, personal communication]. We conserve the binary notation for clarity of the
exposition.
5In a first approach, we tried to suppress V from the axiomatic, defining V = {β : K∗¬β = K⊥}. However,
as John Cantwell points out, irrevocable belief revision possess historic memory, i.e., it does not satisfy: If K =
(. . . (H ∗ α1) . . .) ∗ αn, then K ∗ α = ((. . . (H ∗ α1) . . .) ∗ αn) ∗ α. For deep details of iterable functions see [1].
For example, suppose an agent that always prefers the newest beliefs rather than the oldest. Consequently,
(Cn(∅) + α + β) ∗ (¬α ∨ ¬β) = Cn({¬α, β}),
(Cn(∅) + β + α) ∗ (¬α ∨ ¬β) = Cn({α,¬β}),
but Cn(∅) + α + β = Cn(∅) + β + α.
6idem footnote 4, ∗′ is defined for (Vα, Kα).
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(EE5) If β ≤K α for all β, then ` α. (maximality)
To construct an entrenchment-based irrevocable revision, we can make use of (EE1)−
(EE4), but replacing (EE5) with a modified version of maximality:
(EEi5) α ∈ V if and only if > ≤ α. (i-maximality)
In the standard entrenchment ordering, the maximally entrenched beliefs are ex-
actly the tautologies. I-maximality extends this property to the whole set V.
Lemma 2.1 Let ≤K be an entrenchment ordering on a belief set K that satisfies
(EE1)− (EE4) and (EEi5). Then (V,K) is a complex.
To relate epistemic entrenchment with irrevocable revision we introduce the follow-
ing definition, where we write α < β when α ≤ β and β 6≤ α, and α =≤ β when
α ≤ β and β ≤ α:
Definition 2.2 Let ≤ be an entrenchment relation on a belief set K that satisfies
(EE1)− (EE4) and (EEi5). ∗≤ is an irrevocable entrenchment-based revision if and
only if (V,K) ∗≤ α = (Vα,Kα) where
β ∈ Vα if and only if β ∈ Cn(V ∪ {α}).
β ∈ Kα if and only if either ¬α ∈ V or α → ¬β < α → β. [7, 8]
β ≤α γ if and only if α → β ≤ α → γ. [9]
The last part of the definition allows ∗≤ to be iterable. ≤α represents the new
entrenchment order after the revision by α. Additional properties of this postulate
can be found in [9].
Lemma 2.3 Let ≤ be an entrenchment relation on a belief set K that satisfies (EE1)−
(EE4) and (EEi5). Let ∗≤ be defined as in Definition 2.2. Then:
(a) (Vα,Kα) is a complex.
(b) [9] ≤α satisfies (EE1)− (EE4)
(c) ≤α satisfies (EEi5).
We introduce the following identity [6] to define irrevocable revision in terms of
epistemic entrenchment:
(C ≤∗) α ≤ β if and only if α ∈ K¬(α∨β) implies β ∈ K¬(α∨β).
The next theorems relate irrevocable revision with irrevocable entrenchment-based
revision:
Theorem 2.4 Let ≤ be an entrenchment relation on a belief set K that satisfies
(EE1) − (EE4) and (EEi5). Let ∗≤ defined as in Definition 2.2. Then ∗≤ is an
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Theorem 2.5 Let ∗ be an irrevocable revision on a complex (V,K) defined as in
Definition 1.2. Furthermore let ≤ be the relation defined from ∗ by condition (C ≤∗).
Then ≤ satisfies (EE1)− (EE4) and (EEi5) and ∗ is an irrevocable entrenchment-
based revision defined as in Definition 2.2.
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A Appendix: Proofs
The following properties will be helpful in the proofs
Property A.1 [4] If ` α ↔ α′ and ` β ↔ β′, then: α ≤K β if and only if α′ ≤K β′.
Property A.2 [5] If ≤ satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and (EE3) then, α → ¬β < α → β
if and only if ¬α < α → β.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
We must prove that:
(a) V is a belief set: Let δ ∈ Cn(V), we must prove that δ ∈ V. By compactness of
the underlying logic there is a finite subset {β1, ..., βn} ⊆ V, such that {β1, ..., βn} ` δ.
Part 1. We first show that β1 ∧ ... ∧ βn ∈ V. For this purpose we are going to show
that if β1 ∈ V and β2 ∈ V then β1 ∧ β2 ∈ V. The rest follows by iteration of the
same procedure. It follows from (EE2) that β1 ≤ β1 ∧ β2 or β2 ≤ β1 ∧ β2; then by
(EE1) and (EE5i), β1 ∧ β2 ∈ V. Part 2. By repeated use of Part 1, we know that
{β1∧ ...∧βn} ∈ V. Since β1∧ ...∧βn ` δ, by (EE2) β1∧ ...∧βn ≤ δ, hence by (EE1)
and (EEi5), δ ∈ V.
(b) V ⊆ K: Let β ∈ V, then by (EEi5) > ≤ β. If β ≤ γ for all γ it follows from
(EE1) that > ≤ γ for all γ, and since > ∈ K, then by (EE4), K = K⊥. Hence
β ∈ K. If β ≤ γ for all γ is not satisfied, by (EE4), β ∈ K
.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.
(a) (Vα,Kα) is a complex: We must prove the following cases:
Kα is a belief set: This proof is quite similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1.a.
Let δ ∈ Cn(Kα). By compactness of the underlying logic there is a finite subset
{β1, ..., βn} ⊆ Kα, such that {β1, ..., βn} ` δ. If α ` ⊥, then it follows trivially
from the definition of Kα that β1 ∧ ... ∧ βn ∈ Kα and δ ∈ Kα. Let α 6` ⊥.
Then: Part 1. We show first that β1 ∧ ... ∧ βn ∈ Kα. For this purpose we
are going to show that if β1 ∈ Kα and β2 ∈ Kα then β1 ∧ β2 ∈ Kα. The
rest follows by iteration of the same procedure. It follows from β1 ∈ Kα by
the definition of Kα that (α → ¬β1) < (α → β1). Then by Property A.2,
¬α < (α → β1). Then it follows from β2 ∈ Kα that ¬α < (α → β2). By (EE3),
either (α → β1) ≤ ((α → β1) ∧ (α → β2)) or (α → β1) ≤ ((α → β1) ∧ (α → β2)).
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(α → β2) ≤ (α → (β1 ∧ β2)). In the first case, we use (EE1) and ¬α < (α → β1)
to obtain ¬α < (α → (β1 ∧ β2)) and in the second we use ¬α < (α → β2) to
obtain the same result. It follows that β1 ∧ β2 ∈ Kα. Part 2. By repeated
use of Part 1., we know that {β1 ∧ ... ∧ βn} ∈ Kα. Let ` β ↔ β1 ∧ ... ∧ βn.
We also have ` β → δ, then by the definition of Kα (α → ¬β) < (α → β).
Since ` (α → β) → (α → δ) and ` (α → ¬δ) → (α → ¬β), (EE2) yields
(α → β) ≤ (α → δ) and (α → ¬δ) ≤ (α → ¬β). We can apply (EE1) to
(α → ¬δ) ≤ (α → ¬β), (α → ¬β) < (α → β) and (α → β) ≤ (α → δ) to obtain
(α → ¬δ) < (α → δ). Hence by the definition of Kα , δ ∈ Kα.
Vα ⊆ Kα: Let β ∈ Vα. by the definition of Vα, α → β ∈ V. If α → ¬β ∈ V,
then ¬α ∈ V, hence Vα ⊆ Kα = K⊥. Let α → ¬β 6∈ V, then α → ¬β < α → β,
hence β ∈ Kα from which it follows that Vα ⊆ Kα.
(b) (EE1)− (EE4) See [9].
(c) (EEi5) If β ∈ Cn(V ∪ {α}) then α → β ∈ V, then by (EEi5), for all γ α → α ≤
α → β, hence γ ≤α β for all γ. If γ ≤α β for all γ, then in particular α ≤α β,
α → α ≤ α → β. It follows by (EE1) and (EE2) that, then α → β ∈ V, hence
β ∈ Cn(V ∪ {α})
Proof of Theorem 2.4
(∗1) See Lemma 2.3.a.
(∗2) If ¬α ∈ V, then it follows trivially from the definition of Kα that α ∈ Kα.
Let ¬α 6∈ V. By (EEi5) ¬α < (¬α ∨ α) or equivalently by Property A.1
(α → ¬α) < (α → α). Hence by the definition of Kα, α ∈ Kα.
(∗b) It follows trivially from the definition of Vα.
(∗3) Let ¬α 6∈ K. We must prove that Kα = Cn(K ∪ {α}). We will prove this
identity by double inclusion. For the first direction let β ∈ Kα. We want to
show that β ∈ Cn(K ∪ {α}), which can be done by showing that α → β ∈ K.
by the definition of Kα, since β ∈ Kα, (α → ¬β) < (α → β); hence by (EE4),
(α → β) ∈ K. For the other direction, let β ∈ Cn(K ∪ {α}). Then α → β ∈ K.
Due to ¬α 6∈ K, Cn(K∪{α}) 6= K⊥, then ¬β 6∈ Cn(K∪{α}), then α → ¬β 6∈ K;
and it follows by (EE4) that (α → ¬β) < (α → β). Hence, by the definition of
Kα, β ∈ Kα.
(∗4) Let V 6` ¬α and assume that K = K⊥. Then by the definition of Kα, (α →
¬⊥) < (α → ⊥). By Property A.1 > < ⊥. Contradiction by (EE2). Hence
K 6= K⊥.
(∗5) Let ` α ↔ β. If ¬α ∈ V then β ∈ V, hence by the definition of Kα and Kβ,
Kα = Kβ = K⊥. By Property A.1 it follows for all γ that (α → ¬γ) < (α → γ)
if and only if (β → ¬γ) < (β → γ); hence Kα = Kβ.
(∗df) If ` α, then ` (α∨β) ↔ β and the rest follows from the previous proof of (∗5).
Equivalently if ` β. Let 6` α and 6` β. We have three subcases8:
(a) ¬α < ¬β. It follows from ¬α < ¬β and (EE3) that ¬α =≤ (¬α ∧ ¬β). Then
¬α 6∈ V. We will prove that K(α∨β) = Kα. For one direction let δ ∈ Kα. It
follows from the definition of Kα that (α → ¬δ) < (α → δ). Then by Property
A.2, ¬α < (α → δ). Since (EE2) yields ¬β < (β → δ), we use (EE1) to obtain
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both (¬α ∧ ¬β) < (α → δ) and (¬α ∧ ¬β) < (β → δ). (EE2) and (EE3) yield
(¬α ∧¬β) < ((α ∨ β) → δ). Hence ((α ∨ β) → ¬δ) < ((α ∨ β) → δ) from which it
follows that δ ∈ K(α∨β).
For the other direction, let δ ∈ K(α∨β). It follows by ¬α =≤ (¬α ∧ ¬β) that
6` (¬α∧¬β); then by the definition of Kα, (¬α∧¬β) < ((α∨β) → δ). By (EE2)
((α ∨ β) → δ) ≤ (α → δ). (EE1) yields ¬α < (α → δ), hence α → ¬δ < α → δ
from which it follows that δ ∈ Kα.
(b) ¬β < ¬α: Similar to case (a); K(α∨β) = Kβ .
(c) ¬α =≤ ¬β. Then ¬α =≤ ¬β =≤ (¬α ∧ ¬β) that implies that ¬α ∈ V
if and only if ¬β ∈ V if and only if (¬α ∧ ¬β) ∈ V, hence if ¬α ∈ V, then
K(α∨β) = Kα = Kβ = K⊥. Let ¬α 6∈ V. Then: δ ∈ Kα ∩Kβ if and only if (by
the definition of Kα and Kβ), ¬α < (α → δ) and ¬β < (α → δ) if and only if
(by (EE1)) (¬α ∧ ¬β) < (α → δ) and (¬α ∧ ¬β) < (α → δ) if and only if (by
(EE2) and by (EE3)) (¬α ∧¬β) < ((α∨ β) → δ) if and only if (by the definition
of K(α∨β)) δ ∈ K(α∨β).
(∗c) Let ((V, K) ∗ α) ∗ β = (V′,K′). We will use double inclusion to prove this: For
the first direction, let γ ∈ K′. We have two cases:
(a) ¬β ∈ Vα. Then ¬β ∈ Cn(V ∪ {α}), from which it follows that ¬α ∨¬β ∈ V,
then by the definition of K(α∧β), K(α∧β) = K⊥, hence K′ ⊆ K(α∧β).
(b) ¬β 6∈ Vα. It follows by the definition of K′ that (β → ¬γ) <α (β → γ). Then
by the definition of ≤α, (α → (β → ¬γ)) < (α → (β → γ)). By Property A.1
this is equivalent to ((α ∧ β) → ¬γ) <α ((α ∧ β) → γ); then by the definition of
K(α∧β), γ ∈ K(α∧β); hence K′ ⊆ K(α∧β).
For the second direction let γ ∈ K(α∧β). We have two cases:
(c) ¬(α ∧ β) ∈ V. Then it follows that ¬β ∈ Vα = Cn(V ∪ {α}), then by the
definition of K′, K′ = K⊥, hence K(α∧β) ⊆ K′.
(d) ¬(α ∧ β) 6∈ V. It follows by the definition of K(α∧β) that ((α ∧ β) → ¬γ) <
((α ∧ β) → γ), then by Property A.1, (α → (β → ¬γ)) < (α → (β → γ)), then
by the definition of <α, β → ¬γ <α β → γ. Hence γ ∈ K′ and K(α∧β) ⊆ K′.
(C ≤∗) Let α ≤ β and α ∈ K¬(α∧β). There are two subcases according to the
definition of K¬(α∧β): (a) ¬(α ∧ β) ∈ V: Hence β ∈ K¬(α∧β) = K⊥. (b)
¬(α∧β) 6∈ V: Then (¬(α∧β) → ¬α) < (¬(α∧β) → α), then by Property A.1,
(β ∨¬α) < α. By (EE2), β ≤ (β ∨¬α), it then follows by (EE1) that β < α. We
obtain a contradiction, hence the second case is not possible. The other direction
can be proved by showing that (a) if β < α, then α ∈ K¬(α∧β) and (b) if β <K α,
then β 6∈ K∗¬(α ∧ β).
(a) We can to this by showing ¬(α ∧ β) → ¬α < ¬(α ∧ β) → α, or equivalently,
β ∨ ¬α < α. Suppose for reductio that this is not the case. Then α ≤ β ∨ ¬α.
Since α ≤ α, (EE3) yields α ≤ α ∧ (β ∨ ¬α), hence α ≤ α ∧ β, so that by (EE1)
α ≤ β, contrary to the conditions.
(b) Suppose to the contrary that β < α and β ∈ K¬(α∧β). There are two cases:
(b1) α∧β ∈ V. Then β ∈ V, hence by (EEi5) α ≤ β, contrary to the conditions.
(b2) ¬(α ∧ β) → ¬β < ¬(α ∧ β) → β, or equivalently by Property A.1, to
α ∨ ¬β < β, which is impossible since by (EE2), α ≤ α ∨ ¬β.
Proof of Theorem 2.5
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(a) α ∈ K¬(α∧β): Then by (C ≤∗), β ∈ K¬(α∧β). By (∗1) α ∧ β ∈ K¬(α∧β). It
follows by (∗1) that K 6= K⊥ and by (∗4) α∧β ∈ V, then β ∈ V . (∗1) and (∗b)
yield β ∈ K¬(β∧γ). Then by (C ≤∗), γ ∈ K¬(β∧γ) and by the same reasoning we
arrive at γ ∈ V. Hence by (∗1) and (∗b), γ ∈ K¬(α∧γ).
(b) α 6∈ K¬(α∧β). Let γ 6∈ K¬(α∧γ). Then by (∗1) and (∗b), γ 6∈ V, and it follows
that β∧γ 6∈ V, then by (∗2) and (∗4), β∧γ 6∈ K¬(β∧γ). Since β ≤ γ and (C ≤∗),
β 6∈ K¬(β∧γ). We will arrive at an absurd by proving (b1) α ∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ) and
(b2) α 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ):
(b1) Since ` ¬(α ∧ β ∧ γ) ↔ (¬(α ∧ γ) ∨ (α ∧ ¬β)), it follows by (∗df) and (∗5)
that K¬(α∧γ) ∩K(α∧¬β) ⊆ K¬(α∧β∧γ). By hypothesis α ∈ K¬(α∧γ) and by (∗1)
and (∗2) α ∈ K(α∧¬β); hence α ∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ).
(b2) Due to the hypothesis condition α 6∈ K¬(α∧β) it is enough to prove that
K¬(α∧β∧γ) ⊆ K¬(α∧β). Due to (∗df), (∗5) and ` ¬(α∧ β ∧ γ) ↔ (¬(α∧ β)∨¬γ)
it enough to prove that α∧β 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ). Since α 6∈ K¬(α∧β), then by (∗1) and
(∗b) α 6∈ V and consequently (α∧β∧γ) 6∈ V; then by (∗4) (α∧β∧γ) 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ).
Then by (∗1) either (α ∧ β) 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ) or γ 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ). In the first case
we already have what we need. In the second case, it follows from (∗1) that
(β ∧ γ) 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ); then by (∗df) and (∗5) K¬(α∧β∧γ) ⊆ K¬(β∧γ) and since
β 6∈ K¬(β∧γ), β 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ), hence by (∗1) (α ∧ β) 6∈ K¬(α∧β∧γ) that concludes
the proof.
(EE2) Let ` α → β, and α ∈ K¬(α∧β). Then by (∗1) β ∈ K¬(α∧β); hence by (C ≤∗)
α ≤ β.
(EE3) We have three subcases:
(a) α 6∈ K¬(α∧β). Then by (∗5) α 6∈ K¬(α∧(α∧β)), hence by (C ≤∗) α ≤ (α ∧ β).
(b) β 6∈ K¬(α∧β). In the same way as (a), β ≤ (α ∧ β).
(c) α ∈ K¬(α∧β) and β ∈ K¬(α∧β). Then by (∗1), (α ∧ β) ∈ K¬(α∧β). Hence by
(C ≤∗), α ≤ (α ∧ β) and β ≤ (α ∧ β).
(EE4) From left to right, let α 6∈ K. Then for all β by (∗3) K¬(α∧β) = Cn(K ∪
{¬(α ∧ β)}). Suppose that α ∈ K¬(α∧β). Then (¬(α ∧ β) → α) ∈ K, and since
K is logically closed, α ∈ K. Contradiction, then for all β α 6∈ K¬(α∧β); hence
by (C ≤∗) for all β, α ≤ β. For the other direction let α ≤ β for all β; then in
particular α ≤ ¬α. Then by (C ≤∗) if α ∈ K¬(α∧¬α) then ¬α ∈ K¬(α∧¬α). By
(∗3), since K is consistent, K¬(α∧¬α) = K. Then if α ∈ K, then ¬α ∈ K. Hence
α 6∈ K.
(EEi5) For one direction, let β ≤ α for all β. Then, in particular, > ≤ α. Then by
(C ≤∗) “if > ∈ K¬(α∧>) then α ∈ K¬(α∧>)”. Then by (∗1) α ∈ K¬(α∧>) that is
equivalent by (∗5) to α ∈ K¬α. Hence by (∗2) and (∗4) α ∈ V.
For the other direction, let α ∈ V, then by (∗b), α ∈ Vα∧β for all β. Then by
(∗1), α ∈ Kα∧β for all β, hence by (C ≤∗), β ≤ α for all β.
∗ is an irrevocable entrenchment-based revision We must prove that Vα, Kα
and ≤α are as in Definition 2.2.
Vα: It follows directly from postulate (∗b).
Kα: For the left to right direction, let β ∈ Kα and ¬α 6∈ V, then by (∗1)
(α → β) ∈ Kα and by (∗4) and (∗2) (α → ¬β) 6∈ Kα. Then by (∗5) (α →
β) ∈ K((α→β)∧(α→¬β)) and (α → ¬β) 6∈ K((α→β)∧(α→¬β)). Hence by (C ≤∗),
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the other direction if ¬α ∈ V. It follows by (∗b) that ¬α ∈ Vα, and by (∗1) that
¬α ∈ Kα, hence by (∗2), β ∈ Kα = K⊥. Let (α → ¬β) < (α → β). Then by
(C ≤∗) and (∗5) (α → β) ∈ Kα; hence by (∗1) and (∗2) β ∈ Kα.
≤α: For one direction, let β ≤α γ. It follows by (C ≤∗) that “if β ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ),
then γ ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ)”. Then by (∗c) “if β ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ), then γ ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ)”.
Due to (∗1) and (∗2), it follows that “β ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ) if and only if α → β ∈
Kα∧¬(β∧γ)” and “γ ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ) if and only if α → γ ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ)”. Then “if
α → β ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ) then α → γ ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ)”. Since ` (α∧¬(β∧γ)) ↔ (¬((α →
β) ∧ (α → γ))), hence by (∗5) and (C ≤∗), we conclude that α → β ≤ α → γ.
For the other direction, if γ ∈ Cn(V∪{α}). Then by (∗b), γ ∈ Vα. By (∗b) and
(∗1), γ ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ) for all β, hence by (C ≤∗), β ≤α γ. If α → β ≤ α → γ then
by (C ≤∗) and (∗5), “if α → β ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ) then α → γ ∈ Kα∧¬(β∧γ)”. It follows
by (∗c) that “if α → β ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ) then α → γ ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ)”. Then by (∗1)
and (∗2), “if β ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ) then γ ∈ Kα ¬(β∧γ)”; hence by (C ≤∗), β ≤α γ.
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